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How Large Are Double Markups? 
 
 
 
 If upstream and downstream industries set their prices above their marginal costs, 
downstream prices reflect a double markup. An upstream industry with market power affects the 
price of a downstream industry that it supplies directly or indirectly by supplying other industries 
that provide inputs to the downstream industry. This paper is the first to systematically estimate 
the size of double markups across many industries taking account of these direct and indirect 
effects. It compares estimates of the double markup based on two methods of estimating market 
power. It also demonstrates that the estimated double markups are magnified by increasing 
returns to scale. 
 Our analysis uses a multimarket (incomplete general equilibrium) model for two-digit 
manufacturing industries and for the mining and utility industries, which supply downstream 
manufacturing industries. Unfortunately, we cannot calculate the complete general equilibrium 
effects because we lack the data needed to estimate markups in all industries and a complete 
demand system across all goods.  
 A plethora of theoretical articles, dating from the 1950s, discuss the implications of 
double markups (see the summaries of the literature in Perry 1989, Carlton and Perloff 2005, and 
Riordan 2008). Some of these papers discuss how vertical integration may eliminate the double 
markup (Spengler 1950, Warren-Boulton 1974, and Riordan 2008).   
 However, no empirical studies have systematically estimated how important double 
markups are across industries, and few articles pay explicit attention to the role of returns to 
scale. Empirical articles typically focus on the marketing channel for a single downstream 
industry, typically between an industry’s manufacturers (or wholesalers) and retailers. For 
example, Bresnahan and Reiss (1985) looked at the relationship between an automobile 
manufacturer and its dealers. Kadiyali, Chintagunta and Vilcassim (2000) estimated the shares of 
retailer and manufacturer profits. Chintagunta, Bonfrer, and Song (2002) investigated how the 
introduction of a private label by one retailer affects the relative market power of the retailer and 
the manufacturers. J. Miguel Villas-Boas and Zhao (2005) examined the ketchup market in a 
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single city. Sofia Berto Villas-Boas (2007) examined double marginalization between 
wholesalers and retailers in yogurt supply chains. Gayle (2013) examined double marginalization 
when unaffiliated airlines independently determine the prices for various segments of a trip. 
Crawford et al. (2018) studied the welfare effects of vertical integration in multichannel 
television markets, where one potential effect is the elimination of a double markup.  
 Baqaee and Farhi (forthcoming) addressed the role of market power on productivity and 
misallocation across supply chains in many industries. However, they do not explicitly estimate 
double markups. Our paper differs from theirs because we calculate the price effects from 
eliminating double markups. Also, we use estimated returns to scale, which are increasing; 
whereas, they assumed non-increasing returns to scale.  
 In the first section, we briefly discuss supply chains in manufacturing. In the next section, 
we develop the theory needed to calculate double markups in the presences of returns to scale. 
The third section covers the literature on estimating market power and returns to scale, two 
methods to estimate market power, the data, and our markup and production function estimates. 
Section 4 presents our results on the price and consumer surplus effects from eliminating double 
markups and all markups. Section 5 concludes. 
1. Supply Chains in Manufacturing 
 We want to measure how upstream markups affect downstream prices in manufacturing 
industries. To do so, we investigate the channels by which inputs flow from mining, utilities, and 
upstream manufacturing industries into downstream manufacturing industries.  
 To examine how upstream markups affect downstream prices in manufacturing 
industries, we need to know each downstream industry’s share of upstream manufacturing, 
mining, and utilities inputs. We calculate input flows using data from the 2000 Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) input-output tables and BEA and Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
total cost information. 
 We examine only flows between industries that exceed 6% of total cost. Smaller flows 
are, of course, of relatively little importance. This restriction simplifies our analysis greatly. 
Were we to examine smaller flows, we would see many pairs of industries that supply each 
other. However, all these major flows go in only one direction: If Industry 1 supplies Industry 2, 
Industry 2 does not also supply Industry 1.  
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 As a result of this restriction, we have two non-overlapping vertical supply chains. One 
supply chain “starts” with the mining industry, while the other “starts” with the chemical 
industry.  
 Figure 1 shows the vertical supply chain that start with mining (though the computer and 
electronics industry in this figure is not linked to mining). The percentages on the directional 
arrows are the value of the upstream input divided by the downstream industry’s total cost. For 
example, mining’s input is 78.08% of petroleum and coal’s total cost. 
 The figure illustrates how an upstream industry may supply a downstream industry 
directly or indirectly. For example, inputs from the mining industry flow directly into the 
primary metal industry. In addition, mining supplies utilities, which in turn supplies primary 
metal. Thus, mining provides inputs to primary metal directly and indirectly through utilities.  
 Figure 2 shows the vertical supply chain that starts with chemicals (though wood is not 
linked to chemicals). We use the relationships and input shares that Figures 1 and 2 show to 
calculate the direct and indirect effects of upstream markups on downstream prices. 
2. Theory 
 Although the theory behind the double markup is well-known, the role of returns to scale 
and the downstream price effects with complicated supply chains have rarely been discussed. In 
this section, we start by illustrating the role of returns to scale in determining a double markup 
with a downstream monopoly that buys its only input from a single upstream industry. Next, we 
describe the effects on the price of a downstream monopoly that buys from many upstream 
monopolies along a complex supply chain. Throughout, we assume that industries face constant 
elasticity demand functions, have Cobb-Douglas production functions, and are monopolies.1 
A. One Upstream Industry 
 Suppose initially that a downstream monopoly buys its sole input from a competitive 
upstream industry. The downstream monopoly faces a constant elasticity demand function 𝑋𝑑 =
                                                 
1 We assume industries are monopolized both because doing so greatly simplifies our analysis 
and because this assumption underlies the Diewert and Fox (2008) method of estimating market 
power, which is one of the two approaches we use. 
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𝑝𝑑
𝜀  (or pd =𝑋𝑑
1/𝜀
), where ε is the constant elasticity of demand, pd is the price of the output 𝑋𝑑, 
and the subscript d indicates “downstream.” Its cost function is C(Xd).  
 The monopoly chooses Xd to maximize its profit, 
𝜋𝑑 = 𝑝𝑑𝑋𝑑 − 𝐶(𝑋𝑑) =  𝑋𝑑
1+ 
1
𝜀 − 𝐶(𝑋𝑑). 
Its first-order condition is 
(1 +
1
𝜀
) 𝑝𝑑 −
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑋𝑑
= 0. 
Thus, the markup, M, of price over marginal cost, MC = ∂C/∂Xd, is M = pd /MC = 1/(1 + 1/ε). The 
markup depends solely on the constant elasticity of demand. 
 Now, suppose the downstream monopoly buys its input from an upstream monopoly with 
nonconstant returns to scale. The upstream monopoly uses a single input X, which it purchases at 
price m. It produces its output 𝑋𝑢 using the production process is 𝑋𝑢 = 𝑋
𝑎𝑢 , where au is the 
returns to scale, and the subscript u indicates the upstream industry. The production process 
exhibits increasing returns to scale if au > 1, constant returns to scale if au = 1, and decreasing 
returns to scale if au < 1.  
 The upstream monopoly sells Xu to the downstream monopoly at a price of pu. The 
downstream monopoly uses Xu as its sole input to produce its output 𝑋𝑑. Its production function 
is 𝑋𝑑 = 𝑋𝑢
𝑎𝑑 , where ad is the returns to scale.  
 The downstream firm’s objective is to maximize its profit through its choice of 𝑋𝑑: 
 max
𝑋𝑑
 𝜋𝑑 = 𝑝𝑑𝑋𝑑 − 𝑝𝑢𝑋𝑢 = 𝑋𝑑
1+ 
1
𝜀 − 𝑝𝑢𝑋𝑑
1
𝑎𝑑 . (1) 
Its first-order condition is 
 (1 +
1
𝜀
) 𝑋𝑑
1
𝜀 −
𝑝𝑢
𝑎𝑑
𝑋𝑑
1
𝑎𝑑
 − 1
= 0. (2) 
We can rewrite Equation 2 as  
 𝑋𝑑
1
𝑀
 − 
1
𝑎𝑑 =
𝑀
𝑎𝑑
𝑝𝑢, (3) 
where, again, M = 1/(1 + 1/ε) is the downstream monopoly’s markup of price over marginal cost.  
Because 𝑋𝑑 = 𝑋𝑢
𝑎𝑑  , 𝑋𝑑
1
𝑀
 − 
1
𝑎𝑑 = (𝑋𝑢
𝑎𝑑)
1
𝑀
 − 
1
𝑎𝑑 = 𝑋𝑢
𝑎𝑑
𝑀
 − 1
. Substituting this expression into 
Equation 3 and rearranging terms, we obtain the upstream monopoly’s inverse demand function, 
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 𝑝𝑢 =
𝑎𝑑
𝑀
𝑋𝑢
𝑎𝑑
𝑀
 − 1
. (4) 
 Using Equation 4, the upstream monopoly’s profit-maximizing objective is 
 max
𝑋𝑑
  𝜋𝑢 = 𝑝𝑢𝑋𝑢 − 𝑚𝑋 =
𝑎𝑑
𝑀
𝑋𝑢
𝑎𝑑
𝑀 − 𝑚𝑋𝑢
1
𝑎𝑢. (5) 
Its first-order condition is 
 (
𝑎𝑑
𝑀
)
2
𝑋𝑢
𝑎𝑑
𝑀
−1
−
𝑚
𝑎𝑢
𝑋𝑢
1
𝑎𝑢
−1
= 0. (6) 
Substituting Equation 4 into Equation 6, and rearranging terms, we learn that its profit-
maximizing price is 
 𝑝𝑢 =
𝑀𝑚
𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑢
𝑋𝑢
1
𝑎𝑢
−1
. (7) 
 Using Equation 4, the downstream demand function, and some algebra, we obtain the 
downstream price equation2 
 𝑝𝑑 = [
𝑀2𝑚
𝑎𝑑
2𝑎𝑢
]
𝑀𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑢
𝜀(𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑢 − 𝑀)
. (8) 
Thus, the downstream price depends on the upstream firm’s input price, m, the returns to scale 
parameters, 𝑎𝑑 and 𝑎𝑢, and the demand elasticity, ε (because M depends solely on ε).  
 With constant returns to scale both downstream and upstream, 𝑎𝑑 = 𝑎𝑢 = 1, the 
downstream markup, Equation 8, simplifies to  
 𝑝𝑑 = 𝑀
2𝑚. (9) 
Both the upstream and downstream demand functions have the same constant elasticity of 
demand, ε, so they both have the same markup, M, over marginal cost.3 Thus, with constant 
returns to scale, the downstream markup, 𝑀2, is the classic double markup. With nonconstant 
returns to scale, the double markup is implicit in the relatively ugly expression in Equation 8. 
                                                 
2 Substituting Equation 7 into Equation 3, we obtain 𝑋𝑑
1/𝑀 − 1/𝑎𝑑 = [𝑀2𝑚/(𝑎𝑑
2𝑎𝑢)]𝑋𝑢
1
𝑎𝑢
−1
. 
Because Xu = 𝑋𝑑
1/𝑎𝑑 , we can rewrite this expression as 𝑋𝑑
1/𝑀 − 1/(𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑢) = 𝑀2𝑚/(𝑎𝑑
2𝑎𝑢). Using 
the downstream demand curve 𝑋𝑑 = 𝑝𝑑
𝜀  and some algebra, we obtain Equation 8. 
3 If ad =1, then Xu = Xd, so Equation 4.2 implies that 𝑋𝑑
1/𝜀
=  𝑝𝑢 (1 + 1/𝜀)⁄ = 𝑀𝑝𝑢. With 
constant returns to scale downstream, 𝑎𝑢 = 1, 𝑝𝑢 =  𝑋𝑑
1/𝜀
𝑀⁄ , so the inverse demand elasticity, 
1/ε, is the same upstream and downstream. As a result, the upstream markup is also M. 
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B. Many Upstream Industries 
 Our goal is to determine how much upstream markups affect downstream prices across 
many industries, each of which is assumed to be a monopoly. To do so, we need to generalize 
our one upstream and one downstream firm model in two ways. First, the downstream industry 
now uses inputs from several upstream industries. Second, some of the upstream suppliers may 
buy inputs from industries further upstream. 
 Our generalized model differs from our initial two monopolies example in one other key 
way. In the simpler model, we were able to fully analyze the double markup because, with a 
single input, we could derive the upstream demand function explicitly from the downstream 
demand function. In our more general model, we cannot derive the upstream demand functions 
as useful expressions.  
  To conduct a full general equilibrium analysis, we would need a complete set of cross-
elasticities of demand, which is not available. Here, we calculate the effect on downstream prices 
of reducing upstream prices, ignoring any possible downstream substitutions that would affect 
the upstream demand function.  
In our general model, a downstream monopoly in Industry 𝑑 produces a single output 𝑋𝑑, 
which it sells at price 𝑝𝑑. The monopoly uses inputs, 𝐗 = (𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑈), generated by U 
upstream industries. The corresponding input prices are 𝐩 = (𝑝1, 𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑈). Each downstream 
monopoly has a Cobb-Douglas production function, 𝑋𝑑 = ∏ 𝑋
𝑈
𝑢=1 𝑢
𝑎𝑑𝑢
, where u indexes each of 
the U upstream industries.  
 As before, the downstream monopoly faces a constant elasticity of demand function, 
𝑋𝑑 = 𝑝𝑑
𝜀𝑑 , so its profit-maximizing markup is 𝑀𝑑  =  1/(1 +  1/𝜀𝑑). The downstream firm’s 
objective is to maximize its profit:  
 max
𝑿
𝜋𝑑 = 𝑝𝑑𝑋𝑑 − 𝐩𝐗 = [∏ 𝑋𝑢
𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑈
𝑢=1 ]
1+
1
𝜀𝑑 − 𝐩𝐗. (10) 
Its U first-order conditions are  
 𝑎𝑑𝑢 (1 +
1
𝜀𝑑
) 𝑋𝑢
𝑎𝑑𝑢(1+
1
𝜀𝑑
)−1
∏ 𝑋𝑗
𝑎𝑑𝑗(1+
1
𝜀𝑑
)
− 𝑝𝑢 = 0
𝑈
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑢 , (11) 
where 𝑢 = 1, … , 𝑈. Rearranging Equations 11, we can express Xu in terms of the input prices: 
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 𝑋𝑢 =  [𝑀𝑑
𝑀𝑑 [
𝑝𝑢
𝑎𝑑𝑢
]
𝑀𝑑− ∑ 𝑎𝑑𝑗
𝑈
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑢
∏ [
𝑝𝑗
𝑎𝑑𝑗
]
𝑎𝑑𝑗
𝑈
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑢 ]
1
∑ 𝑎𝑑𝑢−𝑀𝑑
𝑈
𝑢=1
. (12) 
Substituting for Xu from Equation (12) in the Cobb-Douglas production function, we find that the 
downstream quantity is 
 𝑋𝑑 = [𝑀𝑑
𝑎𝑑 ∏ [
𝑝𝑢
𝑎𝑢
]
𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑈
𝑢=1 ]
𝜙𝑑
. (13) 
 Consequently, the downstream price is a function of the upstream input prices, the returns 
to scale parameters, and the elasticity of demand:  
 𝑝𝑑 = [𝑀𝑑
𝑎𝑑 ∏ [
𝑝𝑢
𝑎𝑢
]
𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑈
𝑢=1 ]
𝜙𝑑
𝜀𝑑 .  (14) 
where 𝑎𝑑 = ∑ 𝑎𝑑𝑢
𝑈
𝑢=1  is the downstream industry’s returns to scale and ϕd = Md/(ad – Md). With 
constant returns to scale, ad = 1 and ϕd/εd = 1. 
C. Effects of Eliminating Double Markups 
 To calculate the effect of eliminating double markups, we determine how the downstream 
price would change if all upstream markups were eliminated—that is, setting Mu equal to one in 
all relevant industries. To make such a calculation, we not only have to eliminate all upstream 
markups, but we also need to take into account that some upstream suppliers buy inputs from 
other industries even further upstream.  
 To illustrate the issues that arise, consider the supply chain in Figure 3. Each downstream 
industry d is supplied by a different set of upstream industries. Each industry may be upstream of 
some industries and downstream of others. In Figure 3, Industry 2 is a downstream industry for 
Industry 1 and an upstream industry for Industries 3 and 4. (This example corresponds to the 
actual relationship in Figure 1, where mining is Industry 1, utilities is Industry 2, primary metals 
is Industry 3, and fabricated metal is Industry 4.)  
 In Figure 3, Industry 3 buys directly from Industries 1 and 2. However, Industry 1 also 
supplies Industry 2, which directly supplies Industry 3. Thus, Industry 1 has both a direct and an 
indirect effect on Industry 3. Given that input flows go in only one direction, we can calculate 
such indirect effects, which we refer to as second and higher-order effects. 
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 First, suppose that we eliminate market power in a single upstream industry that directly 
supplies an input to a downstream industry. For example, consider the effect of eliminating the 
markup in Industry 2, M2, on the downstream price in Industry 3, p3.  
 Before eliminating the markup, the price of Industry 2’s output, X2, is 𝑝2  =  𝑀2𝑚2, 
where 𝑚2, is the marginal cost of 𝑋2. Using Equation 13, the price of the downstream monopoly 
in Industry 3 is  
 𝑝3 = [𝑀3
𝑎3 [
𝑝1
𝑎31
]
𝑎31
[
𝑀2𝑚2
𝑎32
]
𝑎32
]
𝜙3
𝜀3
. (15) 
where ϕ3 = M3/(a3 – M3). If we eliminate the upstream markup in Industry 2 by setting M2 equal 
to one, the downstream price becomes  
 𝑝3
∗ = [𝑀3
𝑎3 [
𝑝1
𝑎31
]
𝑎31
[
𝑚2
𝑎32
]
𝑎32
]
𝜙3
𝜀3
 . (16) 
Thus, the percentage changes of the downstream price from eliminating market power in 
Industry 2 is  
 
𝑝3
∗−𝑝3
𝑝3
= [𝑀2
−𝑎32]
𝜙3
𝜀3 − 1. (17) 
With constant returns to scale, (𝑝3
∗ − 𝑝3)/𝑝3 = [𝑀2
−𝑎32] − 1. 
 More generally, suppose that we eliminate market power in all the upstream industries, u, 
that directly supply inputs to the downstream Industry 𝑑. Before eliminating the market power, 
the price of the output in each upstream industry 𝑢 is pu = Mumu. If we eliminate all these 
markups, setting Mu = 1 for all u, the change in the downstream price is  
 
𝑝𝑑
∗  − 𝑝𝑑
𝑝𝑑
= [∏ 𝑀𝑢
−𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑈
𝑢=1 ]
𝜙𝑑
𝜀𝑑 − 1.  (18) 
 Equation 18 shows only the direct effect of reducing all upstream markups. For example, 
eliminating the markup in Industry 1 in Figure 3 has both direct and indirect effects on price p3 in 
downstream Industry 3. The change in the downstream price is  
 
𝑝3
∗  − 𝑝3
𝑝3
= [𝑀1
−(𝑎31+𝑎32𝑎21
𝜙2
𝜀2
)
]
𝜙3
𝜀3
− 1, (19) 
where 𝑝3
∗ is the price of 𝑋3 when the markup in Industry 1 equals one.  
 Equation 19 shows that the effect of eliminating the markup in Industry 1 on the price p3 
depends on the exponent of the term in brackets, ϕ3/ε3, which in turn depends solely on the 
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downstream markup, M3; returns to scale, a3; and demand elasticity, ε3. The exponent on the M1 
term reflects the direct and indirect effects of eliminating the markup in Industry 1. The direct 
effect stems from the direct flow between Industry 1 and Industry 3, which is captured by 𝑎31. 
Eliminating the markup in Industry 1 reduces price p3 indirectly through reducing the price p2. 
This indirect effect depends on the flow between Industry 2 and Industry 3, which is captured by 
a32, on the flow between Industry 1 and Industry 2, which is captured by a21, and the price effect 
on p2, which depends ϕ2/ε2, which in turn depend on only M2, a2, and ε2. 
 Similarly, we can calculate higher-order effects for longer channels. For instance, the 
effect of setting all upstream markups equal to one on the downstream price 𝑝4 is  
 
𝑝4
∗  − 𝑝4
𝑝4
= [𝑀1
−(𝑎43𝑎31
𝜙3
𝜀3
 + 𝑎43𝑎32𝑎21
𝜙2
𝜀2
𝜙3
𝜀3
)
𝑀2
−𝑎43𝑎32
𝜙3
𝜀3 𝑀3
−𝑎43]
𝜙4
𝜀4
− 1. (20) 
where 𝑝4
∗ is the price of 𝑋4 when all upstream markups are set equal to one (𝑀1 = 𝑀2 = 𝑀3 =
1).  
 In general, the change in the downstream price pd from eliminating all upstream markups 
is  
𝑝𝑑
∗  − 𝑝𝑑
𝑝𝑑
= [∏ 𝑀𝑢
−(𝛼𝑑𝑢 + ∑ 𝛼𝑑ℎ𝛼ℎ𝑢
𝜙ℎ
𝜀ℎ
  + ∑ 𝛼𝑑𝑖𝛼𝑖ℎ𝛼ℎ𝑢
𝜙𝑖
𝜀𝑖
𝜙ℎ
𝜀ℎ
 +⋯ )
𝑈
𝑢=1 ]
𝜙𝑑
𝜀𝑑
− 1,   (21) 
where h and i are intermediate industries. 
 
D. Consumer Surplus 
 Because the upstream markups increase the downstream price, they decrease downstream 
consumer surplus (and welfare more generally). We calculate this effect for each downstream 
industry. 
Let the original downstream equilibrium be (X, p). If we eliminate all upstream (and 
possibly the downstream) markups, the new downstream equilibrium is (X*, p*). The change in 
consumer surplus in the downstream industry is 
∫ 𝑝𝜀
𝑝
𝑝∗
𝑑𝑝 =
𝑝𝜀+1
𝜀+1
|
𝑝∗
𝑝
=
𝑝𝜀+1−𝑝∗
𝜀+1
𝜀+1
 = 
𝑝𝑋−𝑝∗𝑋∗
𝜀+1
,     (22) 
because 𝑝𝜀+1 = 𝑝𝑋. We can rewrite this change in consumer surplus as 
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 ∫ 𝑝𝜀
𝑝
𝑝∗
𝑑𝑝 =
𝑝𝑋
𝜀+1
(− (
𝑝∗−𝑝
𝑝
) − (
𝑋∗−𝑋
𝑋
) − (
𝑝∗−𝑝
𝑝
) (
𝑋∗−𝑋
𝑋
)). (23) 
Given that we have (
𝑝∗−𝑝
𝑝
) from Equation 21 and that the demand function is 𝑋 = 𝑝𝜀, 
then we can calculate 
(
𝑋∗−𝑋
𝑋
) = [(
𝑝∗−𝑝
𝑝
) + 1]
𝜀
− 1.    (24) 
Thus, we can use Equations 21, 23 and 24, revenue (pX) from our data set, and our 
estimates of 𝜀𝑑 to calculate the change in consumer surplus. 
3. Estimation 
 To determine the size of double markups, we use (1) input flows between industries 
based on input-output and cost data; (2) estimates of markups and returns to scale in two-digit 
manufacturing industries and two other major industries that supply them; and (3) estimates of 
the Cobb-Douglas production functions.  
 We have already discussed the input flows. We start this section by discussing various 
methods of estimating market power and returns to scale, data and period issues, and our 
estimates. Then we discuss the production function estimates. 
A. Methods for Estimating Market Power and Returns to Scale 
 The size of double markups depends critically on the estimates of markups and returns to 
scale at each stage of the supply chain. As the estimates from the literature vary, we consider 
several methods.  
 Many articles estimate industry markups. In his classic paper, Harberger (1954) 
calculated market power using the limited aggregate data on profits available at the time. He 
concluded that the U.S. economy had virtually no market power distortions: “Nothing to see 
here. Move along folks.” 
More recent, new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) papers used advances in 
theory, econometrics, and computing power as well as better data sets to estimate the degree of 
market power using sophisticated reduced-form and structural models (see the survey in Perloff, 
Karp, and Golan, 2007). Many of these papers found substantial market power. 
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 Until the last few years, these NEIO studies focused on a single industry. However, a 
number of recent papers systematic test for or estimate market power across industries, such as 
Hall (1988), Roeger (1995), Diewert and Fox (2008), De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), De 
Loecker et al. (2016), De Loecker, Eeckhout, and Unger (2020), and Hall (2018). See Basu 
(2019) for a review and comparison of several recent methods.  
 To study the importance of double markups and returns to scale, we need estimates of 
industry markups and returns to scale for all relevant industries. Although the various papers De 
Loecker wrote with colleagues are excellent, they used firm-level data or non-U.S. data, so that 
they do not provide industry-level estimates for U.S. manufacturing. Thus, we focus on the 
Diewert and Fox (2008) and Hall (2018) methods to obtain our estimates using U.S. industry-
level data.4 
Diewert and Fox (2008) estimated markups and returns to scale. They assumed that each 
industry functions as a monopoly. They used a nonconstant returns to scale translog cost function 
with neutral technical change, decomposing productivity growth into contributions from returns 
to scale and to technological progress. Treating input prices as given, they estimated their model 
using ordinary least squares. They argued that likely productivity shocks show up primarily in 
output variables, most likely instruments are not completely exogenous, and these instruments 
are weakly correlated with some inputs for some industries.  
 Hall (2018) estimated markups by determining marginal costs as the ratio of the observed 
change in cost to the observed change in output. He did not explicitly assume constant returns to 
scale. However, he did so implicitly when he uses the Solow residual based on BLS data, which 
imposes constant returns to scale to derive its cost of capital.5 He estimated his model using five 
instruments: military purchases of equipment, military purchases of ships, military purchases of 
software, military expenditures on R&D, and the oil price.  
                                                 
4 The older Hall (1988) paper and Roeger (1995) are possible alternative. Hall (1988) is a 
seminal article on the estimation of markups across industries. Roeger (1995) and others built 
upon Hall’s original approach to estimate markups. As Hall prefers his more recent approach, we 
follow his lead. Roeger’s paper produces market power estimates that are of comparable size to 
Diewert and Fox and Hall’s more recent papers, though the time periods differ. 
5 Hall argues that his estimates are not biased in the presences of increasing returns to scale. 
Thus, although we henceforth say that Hall assumes constant returns to scale, it might be more 
accurate to describe him as being agnostic about the returns to scale. 
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B. Data 
 We want to compare the double markups implied by estimates of the Diewert-Fox and 
Hall models. To make this comparison clear, we use a single data set to estimate both models.  
  Diewert and Fox (2008) used data for the two-digit manufacturing industries. Hall (2018) 
examined most one-digit industries, including mining, utilities, and manufacturing among others. 
Because we think looking at supply chains at the two-digit level makes more sense than at the 
one-digit level, we concentrate on two-digit manufacturing industries plus mining and utilities, 
which supply those industry. (We ignore agriculture because it is competitive.) 
   The primary data set in both Diewert-Fox and Hall is the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) industry-level output and input quantity Törnqvist indexes for output and inputs. The BLS 
provides information about capital, labor, and intermediate input costs. However, the BLS 
calculates the cost of capital by assuming that costs equal revenue, which implies constant 
returns to scale. Because they want to estimate returns to scale, Diewert and Fox used the U.S 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) cost of capital information (Table 3.45, Current Cost 
Depreciation of Private Structures by Industry). The BLS does not provide industry-level output 
and input quantity Törnqvist indexes for mining and utilities, so we used BEA data to calculate 
the Törnqvist indexes for these two industries.  
C. Period of Study and Instruments 
 To make the Diewert-Fox and Hall estimates comparable, we estimate both models for 
the same period. We also have to decide on whether to estimate the models using instruments or 
not. 
 Diewert and Fox (2008) used 1949–2000 data; whereas, Hall (2018) used 1987–2015 
data. Several studies including De Loecker, Eeckhout, and Unger (2020) and Hall (2018) argued 
that markups have been increasing over time and provided various explanations. An examination 
of both BLS and BEA data between 1949 and 2016 indicates a clear structural shift starting 
around 2000. Figure A1 in the Appendix shows that a pronounced plunge in input and output 
indexes occurred in many industries at that time. Given this major change in trends, the larger 
13 
 
variability, and the limited number of years in the post-2000 period, we use the Diewert and Fox 
period, 1949–2000, to estimate both models.6  
Diewert and Fox, after arguing against using instruments, estimated their model 
employing ordinary least squares (OLS). Although Hall (2018) used instruments for a later 
period, we estimate his model for this earlier period using OLS for three reasons. First, not all of 
his instruments are available for some of the earlier years. Second, several of the remaining 
instruments are weak for at least some industries (see Duran-Micco 2019). Third, these 
instruments may not be exogenous to all macroeconomic fluctuations (see Hall 1988 and Roeger 
1995). 
 How do these decisions about the time period and instruments affect our estimates? 
Duran-Micco (2019) estimated the Diewert and Fox (2008) and Hall (2018) models for several 
periods, with and without instruments.7 She found that the returns to scale and markup estimates 
are sensitive to each of these choices. Using Hall’s instruments that are available for the earlier 
period (oil price and military purchases of equipment, intellectual property products, and 
research and development) for both Diewert and Fox’s and Hall’s methods produces very 
imprecise estimates. Moreover, for several industries the point estimates of the markup are 
implausibly negative.  
D. Estimated Markups and Return to Scale Estimates 
We report OLS estimates for both models in Table 1. Although the table does not show 
hypothesis tests for Diewert and Fox’s market power estimates, these estimates are a 
transformation of their returns to scale estimates, so the hypothesis tests corresponds to the 
returns to scale tests. In the table, the null hypothesis is that the coefficient equals one: either 
constant returns to scale or no market power. 
The estimates for the Diewert and Fox method replicate their results for the 
manufacturing industries because we are using their time period and estimation method. Because 
                                                 
6 Because we use this earlier period, our industry definitions are based on the Standard Industrial 
Classification. More recently, the BLS switched to the North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS), but it did not reclassify its older data using this system. 
7 She also found that the results using BLS and BEA data were qualitatively comparable, but the 
BEA estimates of market power were generally smaller than those using the BLS data. 
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Hall did not look at this earlier period and did not provide estimates for two-digit manufacturing 
industries, we cannot compare our results to his.  
  Despite having different underlying theories, Hall (2018) and Diewert and Fox (2008) 
estimated the same regression equation (see Duran-Micco, 2019). However, they interpret the 
parameters of the equation differently. Hall estimated the price markup conditional on assuming 
constant returns to scale. The Diewert and Fox estimates of returns to scale are the same as 
Hall’s estimates of the price markup (as the first two columns of Table 1 show). Diewert and Fox 
then use the estimated returns to scale to determine the price markup. For example, Hall’s 
estimated markup for mining is 1.320. Diewert and Fox’s estimated returns to scale estimate is 
1.320, and their estimated price markup is 1.601. The markup estimates are systematically 
smaller using Hall’s method than Diewert and Fox’s method. 
 Using either set of estimates, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the markup is one in 
the apparel, textile, utilities, and wood industries at the 5% level. Nonetheless, in the following 
analyses, we use the (nearly one) point estimates for these industries. 
 Given that the markup in a monopoly industry is M = 1/(1 + 1/ε), we can use the 
estimated markups to infer the elasticities of demand: ε = M/(1 – M). Thus, in our calculations of 
the double markups, the demand elasticities vary with the method we use to estimate the 
markups.  
E. Estimated Cobb-Douglas Production Functions 
We use a two-step procedure to estimate our Cobb Douglas production-function 
coefficients. For downstream Industry d, sdu is the share of total cost, C(Xd) spent on input Xu:  
𝑠𝑑𝑢 =
𝑝𝑢𝑋𝑢
𝐶(𝑋𝑑)
. 
We calculate these input shares using BEA input-output and total costs data. By construction, 
these input shares sum to one: ∑ 𝑠𝑑𝑢 = 1𝑢 .  
 With the Diewert and Fox approach, we use their estimates of the downstream industry’s 
returns to scale 𝑎𝑑. With the Hall method, we assume constant returns to scale, ad = 1. Using the 
values for sdu and ad, we calculate the Cobb-Douglas production function parameters for the 
downstream industry as adu = adsdu. Consequently,  
𝑎𝑑 = ∑ 𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑢 . 
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4. Price and Consumer Surplus Effects from Eliminating Market Power 
To measure the size of double markups, we calculate how eliminating market power 
upstream would lower downstream prices. First, we calculate the downstream price effects of 
eliminating market power in a single upstream market, by setting its markup equal to one. 
Second, we calculate the impact on downstream prices from eliminating all upstream markups. 
Third, we calculate the effects from eliminating all upstream and downstream markups on 
downstream prices. Finally, we calculate the consumer surplus effects. 
F. The Price Effects from Eliminating One Upstream Markup 
We start by calculating the downstream effects of eliminating one upstream markup. 
Figures 1 and 2 show that the mining and chemical industries are upstream from virtually all the 
other manufacturing industries. Thus, we start by calculating the downstream price effects of 
eliminating the markup in each of these industries. 
Table 2 shows the price effects for all the industries that are downstream from mining. 
Table 3 shows these effects for industries that are downstream from the chemical industry. 
To illustrate the role of both markups and returns to scale, we present calculations using 
approaches. The first column of each table uses Diewert-Fox markups and jointly estimated 
returns to scale, which we refer to as DF-IRS because all the estimated returns to scale exhibit 
increasing returns to scale (IRS). The second column uses the Diewert-Fox estimated markup, 
which were jointly estimated with nonconstant returns to scale, and then sets the returns to scale 
parameters equal one (constant returns to scale, CRS). We refer to this method as DF-CRS. The 
final column uses Hall’s method, which implicitly assume CRS. 
The mining markup is a moderate 1.32 using Hall’s method and 1.60 using Diewert and 
Fox’s method. By comparing the DF-IRS estimates to the DF-CRS or Hall calculation in Table 
2, we see that double markups are substantially larger with increasing returns to scale than with 
constant returns to scale. For example, eliminating the markup in mining reduces the 
downstream price in primary metals by 4.16% using DF-CRS or 2.47% using Hall, but would 
reduce the downstream price by 20.48% accounting for increasing returns to scale using DF-IRS. 
The double markup is large in all downstream sectors given increasing returns to scale, and 
relatively large in petroleum and coal and utilities even with constant returns to scale. 
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Eliminating the mining markup has a very large price effect on petroleum and coal for 
two reasons. First, mining inputs are 78% of petroleum and coal total cost (see Figure 1). 
Second, petroleum and coal has a moderately large returns to scale, 1.344.  
The chemical markup is large: 2.176 (Hall) or 2.692 (Diwert-Fox). Again, we see that 
eliminating this markup has much larger downstream price effects given increasing returns to 
scale in Table 3. The double markup is large in all markets given increasing returns to scale, and 
large in plastic and textiles even with constant returns to scale. 
G. The Price Effects from Eliminating All Double Markups 
 We used Equation 21 to calculate the effects of eliminating double markups by 
eliminating all upstream markups, so that only downstream markups remain. Table 4 shows the 
percentage change in downstream prices from eliminating all upstream markups. The table does 
not include the chemical, computer and electronics, mining, or wood industries because they are 
not downstream from any of our other industries.  
The DF-IRS method in the first column shows very large reductions in downstream 
prices from eliminating the double markups. The decrease in price is larger than 50% for three 
industries: plastic (73%), petroleum and coal (70%), and printing (63%).  
The price reductions from eliminating double markups impacts are substantially lower 
given constant returns to scale (in the second and third columns). For instance, the price 
reduction in petroleum and coal with the DF-IRS method of 70% falls to 31% if we impose 
constant returns to scale (DF-CRS) or 19% using Hall’s method. Indeed no double markup 
exceeds 31% with the DF-CRS method or 21% with Hall’s. Using the Diewert-Fox markup 
estimates, imposing constant returns to scale cuts the double markup at least in half in all 
industries except textiles and utilities, and often cuts the double markup by much more, 
sometimes to nearly one-eighth. 
With the Diewert and Fox approach, eliminating double markups would reduce downstream 
prices by between 10% and 73% across 13 industries, with prices falling by more than 25% in 10 
industries and by more than 40% in 6 industries. With the Hall approach, downstream prices 
would fall by between 3% and 21%, with prices falling by more than 15% in 3 industries. 
Because the Diewert-Fox estimated markups are larger than Hall’s, both the DF-IRS and 
DF-CRS price reductions from eliminating the double markup exceed the Hall price reductions. 
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Printing is a good example of the role of the role of direct and indirect effects. The 
chemical industry supplies the paper industry, which in turn supplies the printing industry. Table 
3 shows that eliminating market power only in the chemical industry reduces the price in paper 
by 44.82%, and in printing by 33.18% (DF-IRS). Table 4 shows that printing falls by 62.57% if 
we eliminate the markup in both the chemical industry and in the paper industry. 
H. The Price Effects from Eliminating Upstream and Downstream Markups 
 Of course, the price effects is greater if all upstream and downstream markups are 
eliminated, as Table 5 shows.  
 Allowing for increasing returns to scale (DF-IRS in the first column), eliminating all 
markups would cause a price reduction of 50% or more in nine industries, compared to only 
three in Table 4, which shows the effects of eliminating only the double markup. Given constant 
returns to scale in the DF-CRS and Hall estimates, the price decreases are smaller, but still 
substantial. Only one industry (apparel) had its price drop by less than one-fifth with the DF-
CRS estimates, and only three did with the Hall estimates. 
 What part of the total price reduction of eliminating market power is due to upstream 
effects only? Table 6 shows the percentage share of the total downstream price reduction that is 
due to eliminating only the upstream markup. This share is at least 50% for all industries except 
stone, clay & glass and utilities with the DF-IRS model. It is over 80% for four industries and is 
92% for plastic. These shares are much higher for this method than for the other two methods, 
textiles and utilities aside. However, four industries have a share greater than 50% with both the 
DF-CRS and Hall approaches. Thus, according to any of these approaches, double markups are 
important in many industries. 
I. Consumer Surplus Effects from Eliminating All Upstream Markups 
 Obviously, these price reductions from eliminating market power would have consumer 
surplus benefits. To illustrate the magnitude of the double markup on consumer surplus, we ask 
how much consumer surplus would rise if we reduced all upstream markups by 1%. Table 7 
shows the resulting change in consumer surplus as a percentage of industry revenue in 2000. 
With constant returns to scale, the consumer surplus gain would be less than one percent in all 
downstream industries. However, with increasing returns to scale, the consumer surplus gain 
18 
 
would significantly exceed 1% in fabricated metal, furniture, petroleum and coal, plastic, and 
transportation. 
Conclusion  
 This study is the first to systematically estimate the price effects of double markups 
across two-digit manufacturing industries. Because the results are sensitive to the estimated 
markup in each industry, we compare the estimation methods of Diewert and Fox (2008) and 
Hall (2018). 
 The Diewert and Fox approach provides estimates of markups and returns to scale. The 
Hall markup estimates implicitly assume constant returns to scale. The Diewert and Fox markup 
estimates are larger than the Hall estimates, so our estimates of the double markup effects would 
be larger with the Diewert and Fox estimates for that reason alone. However, our estimates of the 
double markup are even larger with the Diewert and Fox approach because their method 
produces estimates of increasing returns to scale in all industry, which substantial increases our 
estimates of the double markup’s effects. Eliminating upstream markups—that is, the double 
markups—would reduce downstream prices by between 10% and 73% across the 13 industries 
using the Diewert and Fox approach, but by only 3% to 21% with the Hall method. 
 Eliminating all markups including the downstream markups would have very large price 
effects with both approaches. The downstream prices fall by between 25% and 81% with the 
Diewert and Fox approach and between 9% and 53% with the Hall method. 
 Much of the total downstream markup is due to upstream markups; that is, double 
markups. Were we to eliminate all upstream and downstream markups, upstream markups would 
account for between 26% and 92% of the downstream price reduction using the Diewert-Fox 
method and between 7% and 91% using Hall’s method. 
 The sizeable price decreases from eliminating market power would increase consumer 
surplus. Given increasing returns to scale, a 1% reduction in upstream markups would increase 
consumer surplus by much more than 1% in fabricated metal, furniture, petroleum and coal, 
plastic, and transportation. 
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Appendix  
 Starting about 2000, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) input and output indexes for many 
manufacturing industries exhibit pronounced changes in trends. The left column in Figure A1 
shows the input index and the right column shows the corresponding output index for several 
industries (see Duran-Micco 2019 for figures for all manufacturing industries).  
 Traditionally, the BLS used the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) to define 
industries. In 1997, a new classification, the North American Industry Classification 
System (NAICS) was introduced. The NAICS increased coverage of the service sector, relative 
to SIC, but it did have some effects on manufacturing industry definitions.  In the figure, the blue 
dots reflect the BLS data for 1948–2000 based on the SIC. The red dots correspond to BLS data 
for 1987–2016 based on the NAICS.  
 Although part of the change may be due to the change in the classification definitions. 
Pierce and Schott (2016) and Baily and Bosworth (2014) attribute this change in trend to the 
granting of permanent normal trade relations to China in 2000. In addition, both output and input 
indexes cratered around 2007 in most industries due to the Great Recession.  
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Figure A1: BLS Input and Output Indexes for Various Manufacturing Industries 
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Figure 1  
The Vertical Supply Chain that Starts with Mining 
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Figure 2  
The Vertical Supply Chain that Starts with Chemicals 
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Figure 3  
A Supply Chain Example 
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Table 1 
Estimates of Price Markups and Returns to Scale 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Estimates using Hall (2018) and Diewert and Fox (2008) methods for 1949–2000.  
∗∗∗ Reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient equals one at the 1 percent level.  
  ∗∗ Reject the null hypothesis at the 5 percent level.  
    ∗ Reject the null hypothesis at the 10 percent level. 
Although the table does not show hypothesis tests for Diewert and Fox’s market power 
estimates, these estimates are a transformation of their returns to scale estimates, so the 
hypothesis tests corresponds to the returns to scale tests.  
  
 Hall   Diewert and Fox 
 Markup   Returns to Scale Markup 
Apparel 1.038   1.038 1.100 
Chemical 2.176***   2.176*** 2.692 
Computer & Electronic 1.389***   1.389*** 1.593 
Fabricated Metal 1.163***   1.163*** 1.271 
Furniture 1.213***   1.213*** 1.288 
Machinery 1.304***   1.304*** 1.452 
Mining 1.320***   1.320*** 1.601 
Paper 2.060***   2.060*** 2.350 
Petroleum & Coal 1.344***   1.344*** 1.579 
Plastic 1.258***   1.258*** 1.339 
Primary Metals  1.311***   1.311*** 1.414 
Printing 1.620***   1.620*** 1.808 
Stone, Clay & Glass 1.405***   1.405*** 1.561 
Textiles 1.028   1.028 1.103 
Transportation 1.273***   1.273*** 1.380 
Utilities 1.051   1.051 1.460 
Wood 1.153*   1.153* 1.330 
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Table 2  
The Percentage Change in Downstream Prices from Eliminating the Mining Markup  
 Diewert-Fox  Hall 
Estimated 
returns to scale 
  
CRS 
  
CRS 
Fabricated Metal  –14.26   –0.97    –0.57 
Machinery   –9.40   –0.34    –0.20 
Petroleum & Coal  –70.38   –30.75   –19.49 
Primary Metals   –20.48   –4.16    –2.47 
Stone, Clay & Glass  –16.29   –3.46    –2.06 
Transportation  –13.84   –0.45    –0.27 
Utilities   –9.89   –8.43    –5.06 
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Table 3  
The Percentage Change in Downstream Prices from Eliminating the Chemical Markup  
 Diewert-Fox  Hall 
Estimated 
returns to scale 
  
CRS 
  
CRS 
Apparel  –15.32   –6.79    –5.37 
Furniture  –33.97   –1.68     –1.32 
Paper  –44.82   –6.01    –4.75 
Plastic   –73.23   –22.15   –17.84 
Printing  –33.18   –0.60    –0.47 
Textiles  –34.40   –25.82    –20.90 
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Table 4  
The Percentage Change in Downstream Prices from Eliminating all Upstream Markups  
 Diewert-Fox  Hall 
Estimated 
returns to scale 
  
CRS 
  
CRS 
Apparel  –18.53   –8.92    –5.99 
Fabricated Metal  –37.58   –9.06    –6.65 
Furniture  –47.81   –6.52     –4.32 
Machinery  –27.37   –4.64    –3.29 
Paper  –44.82   –6.01    –4.75 
Petroleum & Coal  –70.38   –30.75   –19.49 
Plastic   –73.23   –22.15   –17.84 
Primary Metals   –29.91   –6.43    –2.78 
Printing  –62.57   –8.54    –7.24 
Stone, Clay & Glass  –16.29   –3.46    –2.06 
Textiles  –34.40   –25.82    –20.90 
Transportation  –46.09   –8.89    –6.34 
Utilities   –9.86   –8.43    –5.06 
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Table 5  
The Percentage Change in Downstream Prices from Eliminating all Upstream and 
Downstream Markups  
 Diewert-Fox  Hall 
 Estimated 
returns to scale 
 
CRS 
  
CRS 
Apparel  –25.93  –17.20   –9.43 
Computer & Electronics  –37.22  –37.23    –28.01 
Fabricated Metal  –50.89  –28.45   –19.73 
Furniture  –59.48  –27.42   –21.12 
Machinery  –49.98  –34.33   –25.84 
Paper  –76.52  –60.00   –53.76 
Petroleum & Coal  –81.24  –56.14   –40.10 
Plastic   –80.01  –41.86   –34.69 
Primary Metals   –50.43  –33.82   –25.84 
Printing  –79.29  –49.41   –42.74 
Stone, Clay & Glass  –46.38  –38.15   –30.29 
Textiles  –40.53  –32.75   –23.06 
Transportation  –60.93  –33.98   –26.42 
Utilities  –38.28  –37.28   –9.67 
Wood  –24.81  –24.81   –13.27 
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Table 6  
The Percentage Share of the Total Downstream Price Reduction Due to Eliminating the 
Double Markup  
  Diewert-Fox  Hall 
  Estimated 
returns to scale 
  
CRS 
  
CRS 
Apparel   71   52    64 
Fabricated Metal   74   32    34 
Furniture   80   24    20 
Machinery   55   14    13 
Paper   59   10    9 
Petroleum & Coal   87   55    49 
Plastic    92   53    51 
Primary Metals    59   19    11 
Printing   79   17    17 
Stone, Clay & Glass   35   9    7 
Textiles   85   79    91 
Transportation   76   26    24 
Utilities   26   23    52 
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Table 7 
The Change in Consumer Surplus from a One Percent Reduction of all Upstream Markups 
(Percentage of Revenue in 2000) 
 Diewert-Fox  Hall 
Estimated 
returns to scale 
  
CRS 
  
CRS 
Apparel   0.58   0.31    0.32 
Fabricated Metal   1.26   0.27    0.27 
Furniture   1.27   0.19      0.19 
Machinery   0.94   0.15    0.15 
Paper   0.60   0.06    0.06 
Petroleum & Coal   2.66   0.79     0.79 
Plastic    1.36   0.26    0.26 
Primary Metals    0.83   0.15    0.15 
Printing   1.10   0.10    0.10 
Stone, Clay & Glass   0.38   0.08    0.08 
Textiles   0.44   0.31    0.32 
Transportation   1.73   0.27    0.27 
Utilities   0.22   0.19    0.19 
 
 
